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Theme: The EU has a democratic deficit and some reforms have been proposed to 
increase the involvement of national parliaments in its political system. 
 
 
Summary: The existence of the EU implies a dispossession of national parliaments that 
has only partly been resolved at the European level. This classic definition of a democratic 
deficit leaves two possible solutions. The immediate solution is to increase the power of 
the European Parliament (EP) so that it can fully compensate the loss suffered by national 
parliaments. However, problems relating to the EP’s legitimacy and its currently limited 
capacity to engage with citizens restrict this solution’s possibilities. A second option is to 
involve national parliaments in the EU. This option is not problem-free, given the limited 
capacity of national parliaments to equally represent European citizens regardless of their 
nationality. As a result, a third option is proposed: cooperation between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments. In this respect, the establishment of a representative 
office for national parliaments in Brussels can be considered the best possible investment. 
 
 
 
Analysis: The last European elections resulted in a far from encouraging scenario. There 
was a decreasing turnout, down from 62% of citizens voting in 1979 to 45% in 2007 and 
43.39% in 2009. Spain, at 45.81%, remained within the average, but countries such as 
Rumania (27%), Slovakia (19%) and Poland (24%) recorded particularly low levels. Even 
countries with a traditionally high turnout, such as Italy, saw a decrease in the number of 
voters from 71.2% in 2004 to 65% in 2009. 
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Figure 1. European elections: turnout, 1979-2006 
 
 
 1979 1981 1984 1987 1989 1994 1995 1996 1999 2004 2007 2009 
 BE 91.36  92.09  90.73 90.66   91.05 90.81  90.39 
 DK 47.82  52.38  46.17 52.92   50.46 47.89  59.54 
 DE 65.73  56.76  62.28 60.02   45.19 43  43.3 
 IE 63.61  47.56  68.28 43.98   50.21 58.58  58.64 
 FR 60.71  56.72  48.8 52.71   46.76 42.76  40.63 
 IT 85.65  82.47  81.07 73.6   69.76 71.72  65.05 
 LU 88.91  88.79  87.39 88.55   87.27 91.35  90.75 
 NL 58.12  50.88  47.48 35.69   30.02 39.26  36.75 
 UK 32.35  32.57  36.37 36.43   24 38.52  34.7 
 EL  81.48 80.59  80.03 73.18   70.25 63.22  52.61 
 ES    68.52 54.71 59.14   63.05 45.14  46 
 PT    72.42 51.1 35.54   39.93 38.6  36.77 
 SE       41.63  38.84 37.85  45.53 
 AT        67.73 49.4 42.43  45.97 
 FI        57.6 30.14 39.43  40.3 
 CZ          28.3  28.22 
 EE          26.83  43.9 
 CY          72.5  59.4 
 LT          48.38  20.98 
 LV          41.34  53.7 
 HU          38.5  36.31 
 MT          82.39  78.79 
 PL          20.87  24.53 
 SI          28.35  28.33 
 SK          16.97  19.64 
 BG           29.22 38.99 
 RO           29.47 27.67 
 EU total 61.99  58.98  58.41 56.67   49.51 45.47  43.1 
Source: TNS opinion in cooperation with the EP. 
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Elections to the only directly-elected EU institution do not seem to appeal to citizens. 
Those who bothered to vote used the excuse to punish their governments. What is more 
worrying, the European elections have in some cases become golden opportunities for 
extremists and xenophobes to gain seats. It is not the electors who are to blame: time 
after time, political parties present European elections as second-rate contests. Issues 
affecting the EU, such as the reform of its institutions, its role in the world and the debate 
over the ever expanding Union rarely appear as key issues between parties. Even in 
traditionally pro-European countries like Spain parties generally do not promote a sincere 
debate with citizens about their ‘vision of Europe’. In this scenario it is not surprising that 
Europe’s citizens should choose not to get involved in European elections. Additionally, 
given the impenetrable nature of the EP’s multilingual debates, it is no wonder that 
European citizens are apathetic. 
 
It would be wrong, however, to deduce from this that European election results do not 
matter or that the EP is simply a talk-shop. The EP’s history is one of a continuous 
increase in power. The Parliament has evolved from simply having the right to be 
consulted to having a general right to influence legislation through the so-called co-
decision procedure. Moreover, as shown by the case of the services directive –where a 
progressive majority in the EP managed to water down the directive significantly–, the EP 
can shape the nature of the legislation it approves. In addition to the perception of its 
inexistent power, the EP has a legitimacy problem in the eyes of certain European 
citizens. Recent scandals over MEPs’ expenses are certainly no help in enhancing the 
legitimacy of a Parliament that has already had to fight against being seen as a waste of 
tax-payers’ money due to its nomadic character. 
 
According to classical democratic-deficit theory, the EU’s democratic deficit involves the 
dispossession of national representative institutions that are only partly compensated at 
the EU level. The strengthening of democratic mechanisms at the European level is 
required if the EU’s democratic deficit is to be resolved. An option would be to increase 
the power of the European Parliament vis-à-vis other EU institutions. There are several 
ways of achieving this, from establishing a winner-takes-all approach for the assignment 
of positions at the EP to linking the results of the European elections to the composition of 
a hypothetical European government. Indeed, the President of the Commission could 
easily be determined according to the results of the elections of the European Parliament. 
Stronger transnational European parties would be required in order for this to be put into 
practice. Reality, however, could not be more different. This year’s elections have shown 
up the failure of creating an alternative to the EPP’s (Conservatives and Christian-
Democrats) candidate around the Danish ex-prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The 
ongoing process of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and the need to ensure that the 
Commission has a clear vision in order to provide the lead in fighting the global recession 
are amongst the reasons put forward by the socialist Prime Ministers when opting to 
support Durão Barroso. However, were the EP’s power to be extended, there are serious 
doubts that the democratic deficit would be reduced. As noted, despite the EP’s 
increasing power since its creation, European elections continue to be second-tier 
elections used by national parties to show and measure their power for their upcoming 
national elections. This will continue to be the case unless European elections involve 
competing for government offices. At the end of the day, what is the point of winning (and 
voting for) an election in which there is ‘nothing to win’. Additionally, the EP’s decreasing 
turnout and legitimacy problems lead some to see the EP itself as part of the problem 
rather than of the solution. 
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This situation suggests that it might be better to find alternative sources to enhance 
legitimacy at the European level. One proposed solution is to include national parliaments 
in the EU’s political system. Aside from the possibility of thereby reducing the EU’s 
democratic deficit, the inclusion of national parliaments in EU affairs would affect the very 
nature of the Union itself. Europe’s integration process is being developed by states that 
are already well-defined polities. The implication of this for representative democracy in 
the EU cannot be ignored. Involving those polities or ‘pre-existing national democracies’ in 
the EU is not a matter of willingness but of necessity (Crum, 2005, p. 456). 
 
The Danish model is always mentioned when talking about the inclusion of national 
parliaments in the EU. The Danish Folketing posses a mandate whereby it dictates the 
position the government can adopt when negotiating at the Council. However, in practice, 
the method does not lack problems. Very tight mandates can reduce the bargaining 
capacity of a given government and sometimes make agreements impossible. Moreover, 
if the so-called Danish model were to be adopted in every country or even in a majority of 
them, the Council’s ability to reach agreements would certainly be reduced. This would 
diminish the EU’s capacity to deliver results for its citizens. According to Fritz Scharpf 
(1997, 1999), democratic legitimacy is a matter of both the input and output of a political 
system. On the output side, democratic legitimacy requires mechanisms to link political 
decisions with citizens’ preferences. In our democratic systems this is done through 
parliaments. On the output side, Scharpf argues that democracy would be an ‘empty 
ritual’ if the democratic procedure were to be unable to produce effective outcomes, ie, 
‘achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about’ (1997, p. 19). Adherents of input 
legitimacy would emphasise that apart from the fact that national parliaments are closer to 
citizens and reflect in a more adequate manner citizens preferences, only national 
parliaments can provide democratic legitimacy. This view of input legitimacy rests on the 
idea that national parliaments will hold their ministers accountable for decisions taken in 
the Council. However, European integration has eroded the position of national 
parliaments within the national institutional framework reducing the real possibility of 
national parliaments exercising control over government. The main assumption behind 
this argument is that even if a given parliament were to be able to provide parliamentary 
control over its own government, nothing would prevent the government being outvoted in 
the Council under the majority voting rule. Nonetheless, many important decisions in the 
EU are still taken by consensus even though the Council’s rules allow other 
arrangements. Another argument for seriously considering the involvement of national 
parliaments at the EU level is that they are the authorisers of the Treaties. Thus, as long 
as the EU continues to develop by successive revisions of the Treaties, national 
parliaments will continue to play a role. 
 
Some commentators have gone as far as to suggest the idea that political representation 
at the EU level could be arranged by side-lining the EP (The Economist, 6/VI/2009). This 
option, apart from being politically impossible now that the EP is well established, is not 
exempt from problems either. Relying on national parliaments and excluding the EP would 
produce political inequality and a situation in which citizens would be represented 
differently depending on where they live, due to the national parliaments’ differing powers 
and capabilities. Unlike national parliaments, the EP represents citizens of the Union 
regardless of where they live, and since it operates at the level of the Union it is in a 
position to take part in a deliberation process that takes into account the views of all the 
Union’s members. For that reason, unless good functioning networks of interparliamentary 
cooperation are established, national parliaments are not ‘the most obvious fora’ (Lord, 
2004, p. 181) either for deliberation at the level of the Union’s political system or for taking 
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decisions on behalf of the polity as a whole. In sum, relaying on national parliaments to 
solve the EU’s democratic deficit involves a problem of representation because only the 
EP represents every citizen equally at the EU level. Consequently, it would seem logical 
and desirable to prescribe an increase in the EP’s powers. Ultimately, certain kinds of 
collective goods are currently possible only at the European level. An example would be, 
for instance, the need for durable solutions to the current economic crisis, which 
protectionist policies could only aggravate. However, unless current problems such as the 
‘second-rate’ nature of its elections and the perceived low legitimacy enjoyed by the EP 
are resolved, an increase in the powers of the national parliaments would only aggravate 
the problems. 
 
A possible solution to this dilemma is to understand representative institutions at the 
national and European levels as two sides of the same coin rather than as two competing 
or opposing systems. Parliamentary cooperation, however, is not an easy task. First of all, 
parliaments regard each other as a threat. An increased role of the national parliaments 
could prompt EP resistance since it could be used as an excuse to question the need for 
a stronger EP. At the same time, national parliaments have interpreted every increase in 
the EP’s powers as a downgrading of their own role (Norton, 1996). It should also be 
noted that national parliaments –or, more specifically, MPs– do not always see a clear 
reward for the time they spend on scrutinising EU policies. However, it could also be 
argued that cooperation between parliaments could help to enhance one of the main roles 
of parliaments: controlling the executive. It is in this context that the interest of national 
parliaments in institutionalising parliamentary control over national governments’ actions 
at the European level needs to be understood. As for the EP, increased parliamentary 
cooperation would enhance its position as a representative body of European citizens. 
This requires a change of paradigm regarding the relationship between the national 
parliaments and the EP. The relationship between the EP and the national parliaments 
has been based on a level approach, that regards them as mutually exclusive (Wessels, 
1996). From this it follows that ‘the legitimising and accountability function of national 
parliaments is sufficiently exhausted wherever the European Parliament has a formal 
decisive role’. As a result, issues classified as ‘European’ risk being immediately excluded 
from national scrutiny (Besselink, 2006, p. 129). A different paradigm, based on a 
polycentric approach, would consider the two types of parliaments as complementary, 
with the EP fulfilling a role at the EU level that is not identical to the role of national 
parliaments with regard to EU issues (Besselink, 2006, p. 129). In short, the role of 
national parliaments and the EP should be understood as additive and complementary 
rather than as mutually exclusive. In practical terms, this would imply a division of labour, 
that would make it possible for democratic control to be shared between the EP acting at 
the level of the political system itself and national parliaments influencing the input of 
national governments to the Council of Ministers. The role of national parliaments would 
be to influence ministers at the level of the Council ex-ante. This would require sufficient 
and timely information regarding the issues at stake as well as knowledge on the EU’s 
decision-making timetable. The EP’s role would be to fill the information and expertise 
gaps by extracting information from the EU’s institutions and evaluating Union policy. 
Effective channels of communication between national parliaments and the EP would thus 
be essential. 
 
The advantages of this model are that national parliaments would be able to use their 
superior ability to engage public attention and control governments at the level of the 
Council, while the EP would provide control over the Council as a whole by applying 
checks and balances on everyday policy-making. The EP would also be able to provide 
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information and analysis on European affairs due to its permanent focus on the European 
arena and its higher (compared to national parliaments) competence in monitoring a 
highly complex political system. Instead, national parliaments would bring the Union 
‘closer to its citizens’. 
 
Building on this idea, the Lisbon Treaty (if finally ratified) provides that one third of national 
parliaments can object to a draft legislative proposal on the grounds of a breach of 
subsidiarity. This provision shows two main things. First, that the EU is serious about 
providing an increasing role for national parliaments, considered for years to be outside 
the EU’s political system. Secondly, that parliamentary cooperation is needed if 
parliaments are to make use of the possibilities the Treaty offers them. National 
parliaments would need a considerable amount of information if they are to follow every 
EU legislative initiative. Apart from the need to develop effective sifting systems, fluid 
cooperation with the EP could help with acquiring and filtering of information regarding the 
EU’s legislative process. The requirement of a minimum of a third of the national 
parliaments opposing a legislative proposal for it to be withdrawn requires parliaments to 
coordinate their views. National parliaments have established representative office at the 
EP’s premises in Brussels. These representative offices have, in most cases, one or two 
permanent staff. Brussels liaison offices follow the EU legislation process closely and 
report back to their parliaments. The offices are useful tools for sharing information and 
good-practices. They can also be key players if national parliaments are interested in 
coordinating their views. The spirit amongst delegates helps, since they often exchange 
information which might be relevant to other parliaments. Meetings with the respective EP 
staff in charge of relations with national parliaments also provide further possibilities for 
information and relations. This means that parliaments lacking a representative at the EP 
are missing out. So far, all Member States except Slovakia, Spain and Malta have a 
representative at the EP. Giving the EU’s current and future development, the need to 
explore the possibilities of parliamentary cooperation seems of extreme importance. The 
opening of a national parliamentary representative office at the EP’s premises is certainly 
one of the best possible investments in this direction. 
 
Conclusion: Certain reforms have taken place in order to increase the involvement of 
national parliaments in the EU’s political system. An example is the possibility for national 
parliaments of activating a fire-alarm mechanism if the principle of subsidiarity is violated. 
Admittedly, this type of reforms, intended to increase the system’s input legitimacy, 
increase the number of veto players and can eventually compromise its effectiveness and 
capacity to satisfy citizens’ demands. However, the challenge must be accepted and 
overcame intelligently. 
 
Daniel Ruiz de Garibay 
Basque Government Research Scholar, University of Reading 
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